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Abstract: Whereas much recent research has tried to understand the role of sectarianism in the 
Syrian conflict, few studies address the issue from a bottom-up viewpoint as seen from people’s 
everyday and lived experiences. This article seeks to access trajectories of sectarian identity 
formations through Syrian refugee narratives, articulated in stories that evolve around the 
revolution and the emerging civil war. It questions how the sectarian debate is experienced and 
reflected upon from refugees’ micro-narrative perspectives and the ways in which these experiences 
correspond to politicized frames operating on a macro-level. By taking the concept of ‘sectarianism’ 
as a theoretical vantage point, the study argues for a dynamic identity approach when attempting 
to understand complex processes of contested and contesting identities. Moreover, it suggests that 
by replacing the concept of sectarianism with ‘sectarianization’, we may provide a more nuanced 
understanding of processes in which religious identities are discursively constructed and mobilized 
in conflicts such as the Syrian one. The qualitative analysis of this study is based on in-depth 
narrative interviews with a multi-religious Syrian refugee population residing in Norway. Divided 
into four narrative clusters, their stories deal with hope, fear, victimization as well as hate and 
distrust. Through the extremities of revolution and war, each of these clusters reveal particular 
memories, moments and experiences that in various ways have informed and shaped issues of 
identity and perceptions of the ‘religious other’. Taken together, their stories expose a valuable 
juncture through which the complexities surrounding religion, identity and conflict can be further 
studied. 
Keywords: refugee narratives; Syria; interreligious relations; sectarianization; conflict; religion; 
identities; revolution; war 
 
1. Introduction  
“We had the chance to breathe freedom, and that was 
a wonderful feeling. I felt we were born again!” 
“Sectarianism is in the blood of Syria. It’s not 
positive or negative, but it’s a reality.” 
“[I]t came to a point where everyone knew that, ok, 
now it is eternal, it will all go to hell!”1 
Representations of utopia and dystopia illustrate two metaphorically compelling frames 
enveloping the stories I have gathered from Syrian refugees in exile. Together they frame a narrative 
                                                 
1 Citations from conversations with Syrian refugees taking part in this study. 
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space within which a discursive plurality of refugee voices take place. They oscillate between 
exuberant hopes of a new and democratic era beginning with the revolution in 2011 and feelings of 
despair regarding the subsequent descent into violence, war, and forced displacement. Embedded in 
these stories is the question of ‘sectarianism’—or the ways in which religious identities and 
differences are constructed, mobilized, and gain momentum—socially, culturally, and politically.  
The case of sectarianism in Syria, as seen from the perspective of Syrian refugees, is a particular 
interesting phenomenon to study. The country’s long-standing history of ethno-religious diversity 
and peaceful intercultural coexistence is intriguing, albeit not necessarily a shared interpretation of 
the past to which all Syrians adhere. Behind the events of 2011 and onwards, there is a multi-layered 
context triggering an overall question into the reasons why Syria could spiral so quickly into violent 
conflict and fuel divides along sectarian lines. One way to trace the ‘roots and routes,’ so to speak, of 
these contestations and their religious implications, is to lend ears to the dispersed Syrian refugee 
population itself. Guided by the following questions, this study attempts to trace processes of 
sectarianization through Syrian voices in Norway: How is the sectarian debate experienced and 
reflected upon from refugees’ perspectives and on a micro-narrative level? And how do these 
experiences correspond to politicized frames operating on a macro-level?  
Despite the growing body of literature concerning the role of sectarianism in the Syrian conflict, 
few studies address the issue from sociocultural or religious studies’ perspectives. Fewer still explore 
the formation of sectarian identities and discourses from refugees’ firsthand accounts.2 Thus, there 
is need for a more nuanced understanding of how religion and identifications are perceived to 
operate on the ground in complex conflicts such as in Syria. In particular, as pointed out by Anne-
Marie Korte and Lucien van Liere, we need to look more closely at how “fluid religious identities are 
shaped, (re)invented and (re)appropriated within shifting cultural and political frameworks” (Korte 
and van Liere 2017, p. 3).  
Heeding this call, the current study seeks to access trajectories of sectarian identity formations 
through refugee narratives, articulated in stories that evolve around the revolution and the emerging 
civil war. More specifically, this article inquires how fragments of refugees’ individual life stories 
(re)present, mediate, and validate the meta-discursive frame of sectarianism—or reversely; dispute, 
question, and contradict it. I shall demonstrate that refugees’ experiences are discursively mediated 
and exist in an intersection of micro- and macro narratives, smaller and larger stories, individual 
testimonies and socio-political scripts. Taken together, they expose a valuable juncture through 
which the complexities surrounding religion, identity, and conflict can be further studied.  
Following a methodological overview, this study starts with critically examining the concept of 
‘sectarianism’ and exemplifies how differing approaches theoretically engage with the term in 
analyses of the Syrian conflict. It proceeds to give an overview of Syria’s master narrative landscape 
before devoting the final part to a qualitative analysis where processes of sectarianization are 
explored from below and narrated through stories told by Syrian refugees. Divided into four 
narrative clusters, the stories deal with hope, fear, victimization, as well as hate and distrust. Each of 
these clusters reveal particular moments, events and experiences that in various ways have informed 
and shaped perceptions on identity issues and the emergent differences that arise when conflict and 
religion intersect in narrative trajectories of war.  
2. Methodological Reflections 
The current study is part of a larger empirical project in which narrative trajectories of war, 
forced migratory journeys, and resettlement experiences among Syrian refugees in Norway are 
discussed socioculturally and by employing a religious identity perspective. Altogether, 28 Syrian 
refugees have taken part in this project, both through extended sessions of narrative interviews as 
                                                 
2 Interesting exceptions to note are Salamandra (2013); Stolleis (2015); Schmoller (2016); Gaiser (2017); and 
Tobin (2018). 
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well as in focus groups.3 Together they represent the colorful tapestry of different ethno-religious 
communities that for centuries have characterized the Syrian society. The project’s aim has been 
guided by capturing the versatility of experiences that are voiced from Syrians in exiles. This includes 
looking at how their highly differentiated backgrounds concerning religion, secularism, ethnicity, 
education, and geographical locations have shaped their discursive practices. 
To present a more comprehensive analysis of the issues at hand, this particular study is limited 
to the stories of a few participants in the project, focusing on material that has emerged through 
conversations and in-depth interviews during 2017 and 2018. A further limitation has been drawn as 
regards to the temporal frame of their stories. To more fully grasp the emerging processes of 
sectarianization and changes concerning identity issues, I have decided to restrict the timespan to 
experiences and events that occurred during 2011 and 2012. This is a formative period in the Syrian 
conflict, in which experiences of dramatic changes, crises, and life-turning events took place. At the 
same time, the period represents a foreboding to the ever-escalating tragedy that continued to befall 
Syria in the years afterwards, when—in Yassin al-Haj Saleh’s words—the crisis was no longer merely 
a Syrian one, but a “crisis of the world” (al-Haj Saleh 2017, p. 26). It is important to note, however, 
that by accessing this particular period through narratives, the study does not pretend to give an 
accurate historical account of the revolution and emerging civil war. Nor does it seek paying homage 
to a particular interpretation of this contested period. In concurrence with Marita Eastmond, I view 
narratives not as “transparent renditions of ‘truth’”, but rather as reflections of “a dynamic interplay 
between life, experience and story” (Eastmond 2007, p. 248).  
In Contesting Religious Identities (2017), Korte and van Liere underline the urgency of 
understanding “how religion intersects and interacts with other social, political, and economic 
discourses” (Korte and van Liere 2017, p. 3). This is no less relevant when examining sectarianized 
conflicts. Indeed, in times of conflict, concepts such as religion, ethnicity, nationhood, and language—
the four very “basic sources and forms of social, cultural and political identification” (Brubaker 2013, p. 3, 
emphasis in original; see also Enns 2012, p. 151)—have a tendency to become accentuated, 
encouraged or questioned. As many scholars have pinpointed, studying narratives is a way of 
grasping these dynamic relations, as stories never exist merely in the personal or public domains 
respectively, but intersect in ways that construct complex sites of shared and contested identities 
(Somers 1994; de Fina 2003; Benmayor and Skotnes 2009; Jackson 2013; Ammerman 2014; Andrews 
2014; Hammack and Pilecki 2014; Shenshav 2015). 
Methodologically, I apply a narrative identity approach and find it a useful avenue to research 
the different and fluctuating ways in which narratives play into identity and identifying practices, 
and vice versa. Inspired by, among others, Ricoeur’s anthropological hermeneutics on narrative 
identity (Ricoeur 1991, 1996) and Jackson’s “politics of storytelling” (Jackson 2013), this approach 
investigates the subjective and social constituents of identity through the stories we tell and are being 
told. Language plays an important role concerning issues of identity in war, not least when identities 
are seemingly at war with each other. It shapes people’s worldviews, beliefs, and norms, as well as 
provide legitimacy for individual and collective behaviour. Language can express stereotypes, 
reinforce boundaries, demarcate differences, spur violence and capitalize on fear of the enemy other. 
Yet, it can also enhance understanding, promote coexistence and bridge the gaps of telling each other 
apart. Through language, narratives, and discourses not only reflect but also shape social realities, 
and together they provide a complex site for exploring the powerful ways in which individual and 
                                                 
3 Trying to reflect on the multi-ethnic and religiously diverse mosaic of Syrian refugees, I have selected a broad 
sample of voices from people with varying degrees of attachment to their religious and/or ethnic identity 
backgrounds. Different types of qualitative sampling methodologies were employed in this process. All 
research subjects have been informed of and given consent to the research project and its ethical standards 
prior to participation. Due to issues of political and ethno-religious sensitivity, I have chosen to anonymize 
the participants by applying fictitious names. The research’s ethical standards, ensuring anonymity and 
confidentiality for research participants, have been approved by the Norwegian National Research Ethics 
Committees prior to the interviews (cf. https://etikkom.no/en/). 
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social identities become shared or contested (Briggs 1996, pp. 10–14; Zotzmann and O’Regan 2016; 
van Liere 2014). 
This methodology is certainly not without its flaws and challenges, not least concerning the 
degrees of distance between what is narrated and the actual events they purport to represent. As 
such, there will always be a tension regarding the often complex and ambivalent mixture of memories 
and emotions that inform representations of past events. It is thus important to be aware that 
“…memory remains a shifting and sometimes unstable foundation of war consciousness and its 
associated representations” (Baraban et al. 2012, p. 4). However, whereas no individual testimony or 
hegemonic grand narrative can adequately represent a conflictual past in its entirety, the strengths of 
a narrative identity approach is its reflection on and openness towards a heterogeneous landscape in 
which a myriad of voices find their discursive space. As articulately expressed by Matar and Harb 
(2013), these strengths and limitations can be summarized as follows: 
Narration allows us to examine the diverse discursive spaces and forms within which 
conflict is mediated, communicated, experienced, imagined and lived, while not losing 
sight of the fact that the term narration itself implies subjectivity and agency, if not a 
provisional and partial reconstruction of lives and histories. (Matar and Harb 2013, p. 4) 
3. Sectarianism and Syria—Theoretical Approaches 
The role of religion in the Syrian civil war is a highly disputed issue. So is the notion of 
‘sectarianism’ and the various analyses concerning contested and contesting identities at play. In 
recent years, a considerable amount of publications has discussed whether the term ‘sectarianism’ 
functions as a key prism through which the Syrian conflict can be understood.4 There are, however, 
at least three principal problems attached to the debate on sectarianism in academic and public 
literature. For one, the term itself is rarely defined, leaving it a vague and inconsistent category with 
multiple taken-for-granted understandings and indiscriminate usages. Secondly, and related to this 
definitional indistinctness, the concept is swaying ambiguously between descriptions of religion’s 
pervasiveness in the conflict and instrumentalist explanations downplaying the religious dimension. 
As for the third problem, the term is seldom discussed from a bottom-up viewpoint as seen from 
people’s every day and lived experiences or—for our purposes—investigated through refugees’ 
narrative voices. Rather, it has become a label by which mainly scholars of political science and 
international relations offer top-down analyses attempting to explain identity politics and larger 
geopolitical dynamics in Syria and the Middle East as a whole.  
Despite contributing with much valuable insights to the sectarian debate, many of these studies 
have not yet sufficiently considered how ordinary individuals understand, subscribe to or, 
alternatively, reject the sectarian framing of revolution and war, including the dynamic perceptions 
of the “religious other”. Certainly, information on a more analytical level is needed to understand 
narratives and contexts, just as information from bottom-up perspectives offer additional nuances to 
the whole picture. Thus, there is still need for a critical examination of the concept of sectarianism as 
a discursive category in the academic literature on Syria as well as its individual and contested 
appropriation in personal narratives. As we shall see, a narrative identity approach may allow for 
adding new layers of theoretical understanding to this debate. 
3.1. From Sectarianism to Sectarianization 
It has been said that no one studying the Middle East can begin to understand the region without 
“taking into account the ebb and flow of identity politics” (Telhami and Barnett 2002, p. 2). Indeed, 
conflicts of identity in the Middle East have often been labeled ‘sectarian’ and mostly alluded to the 
perceived ancient hatred and the allegedly irreconcilable encounter between the ‘sects’ of Sunni and 
Shi’a Islam. Although most current scholarship criticizes such an essential reading (cf. Marashi 2014; 
                                                 
4 See among others: Berti and Paris 2014; Farouk-Alli 2014; Browne 2015; Ghobadzdeh and Akbarzadeh 2015; 
Phillips 2015; Atassi 2015; Stolleis 2015; Leenders 2016; Tomass 2016; Hashemi and Postel 2017; Gaiser 2017; 
Pinto 2017; Wehrey 2017; Wimmen 2017; Dixon 2017; Haddad 2017; Soage 2017; Makdisi 2017; Balanche 2018. 
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Soage 2017; Atassi 2015), the term ‘sectarianism’ is still eluding a shared definitional understanding 
and is rarely concerned with identity affiliations outside that of the Muslim context. Many analysts 
appear to use the term by predominantly referring to processes of group formations in which 
religious identities are at stake.5 The ubiquity in use of the term in acemdic literature suggests, 
however, that there exist multiple terminological understandings of sectarianism (Haddad 2017).6  
Notwithstanding, common to most understandings is to view the phenomenon with negativity 
and associate it with hatred, stereotypes, prejudice and violent conflict (Haddad 2017, p. 104; Makdisi 
2017). Such a perception may come out as too one-dimensional, however, as it views sectarian 
coexistence to be a contradiction in terms as well as concealing the fact that sectarian identities have 
managed to positively connect and interact for centuries in the region. In the case of Syria, according 
to Basma Atassi (2015, p. 19), a long and interwoven history of cross-cultural and inter-religious 
relations thus tend to become “missing narratives”—or stories erased from communal memory as 
they fail to fit the negative and mediatized framing of the conflict as sectarian. 
Moreover, as noted by Ussama Makdisi (2017, pp. 3–5), the Arabic term for sectarianism—al-
ta’ifiyya—only became negatively infused during the 20th century when Western colonial interests, 
as well as domestic Arab nationalist discourses, spurred debates on sectarian affiliations as irrational, 
tribalistic, and reactionary remnants from a pre-modern past. Many political intellectuals saw 
sectarianism as an antithesis to the idea of a secular, enlightened, unified and sovereign nation-state 
(Makdisi 2017, pp. 3–5). Such uneasiness with sectarianism may explain why it is not only associated 
with something shameful and taboo but also something potentially dangerous that can threaten 
public peace and national cohesion.  
Other disagreements in literature concern whether sectarian identities and relations are 
something which is felt, imposed, constructed, or inherent in human nature and whether it should 
be studied as a social, religious, or political issue (Haddad 2017, p. 102). These discrepancies are also 
mirrored in what Paul Dixon (2017) distinguishes as three basic types of explanatory models 
regarding sectarianism and conflict. The primordialist model represents a biological answer for 
humans’ predisposal to violence, whereas the ethno-nationalist model points at the influence of 
religion and culture in creating sectarian conflict. Both are essentialist, according to Dixon, in that 
they exclude other conflict-producing factors and dismiss individual agency and cross-cultural 
differences (Dixon 2017, p. 17). In sharp contrast to the previous two models, the instrumentalist 
model (or the “evil politicians/dictator-explanation”) opts for a wider lens regarding how different 
factors and identities interact and intersect over time. However, by overemphasizing the role of 
political systems and elites in creating sectarian violence (Dixon 2017, p. 25), this model frames it all 
exclusively within politics and fails to account for discourses from below, as well as for the salience 
of religion and other cultural identity markers.  
All of these models are represented in analyses regarding the particularities of the Syrian 
conflict. Aligned with the essentialist approach, Mark Tomass asserts in The Religious Roots of the 
Syrian Conflict (Tomass 2016), that religious and sectarian identifications are not merely the products 
of the present war, but rather determining sources of the conflict. In Syria as well as in the Middle 
East at large, he maintains, religious identity has historically been “the dominant determinant of 
political allegiances” (Tomass 2016, p. xii). To understand the Syrian war, he argues, it is essential to 
grasp how groups and individuals continuously “prioritize their religious and sectarian identities” 
(Tomass 2016, p. 5). Although his work is displaying much valuable insight into the multi-ethnic and 
                                                 
5 The Oxford English Dictionaries, for example, offer the following very basic definition of sectarianism: 
“Excessive attachment to a particular sect or party, especially in religion”. 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sectarianism. 
6 Fanar Haddad has identified five principal ways in which the terminology is used academically: (1) An 
expansive approach which subsumes sectarian expressions under an all-inclusive umbrella without 
clarifications or boundaries; (2) A “sect-centricity” approach with an array of different meanings of ‘sect’; (3) 
A political approach that solely focuses on the institutionalization of sectarian identities in political systems; 
(4) A multi-faceted and typological approach avoiding singular definitions and (5) An approach which 
makes sectarianism equivalent to racism. (Haddad 2017, pp. 102–3). 
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multi-religious makeup of the Syrian society, one can argue that it becomes reductionist when 
suggesting that sectarianism is all about religion, inherent religious worldviews, and the inevitable 
clash of different sectarian identities.  
At the other end of the spectrum, in Sectarianism in Syria’s Civil War (Balanche 2018), Fabrice 
Balanche represents an instrumentalist approach in which sectarianism is analyzed as tightly 
interlaced with power, class and urban/rural policies. Whereas Balanche’s work is an impressive 
socioeconomic and geopolitical survey of the importance regarding sectarian identities in Syria, it 
fails to provide a more subtle understanding of the religious dimension of sectarianism. Similarly 
instrumentalistic, but even more opinionated, the Syrian writer and former political prisoner al-Haj 
Saleh provides in The Impossible Revolution (al-Haj Saleh 2017) an in-depth analysis of the type of 
power-related sectarianism he sees as systematically permeating the Syrian political system: 
“[S]ectarianism is a matter of political and social privilege, not a question of identity, culture, or 
religion” (al-Haj Saleh 2017, p. 278). It is a system in which a thoroughly sectarian regime, what he 
calls a “sultanate” with inherited dynastic claims, unjustifiably employs structural differences as a 
tool for discrimination, subordination and enforced loyalty to secure its monolithic domination. 
Again, wheras his analysis offers a comprehensive account of the lenghts to which the Syrian regime 
has exploited and utilized identities for political purposes, it too tends to dismiss other important 
factors and place all moral guilt on the mantle of the political elite (cf. the “evil politicans/dictator”-
model). 
A less reductionist approach is exemplified by Nader Hashemi (2015), whose understanding of 
sectarianism takes a middle ground between that of Balanche and Tomass, but who, similar to al-Haj 
Saleh, sees it firmly within the framework of authoritarianism rather than that of the theology of faith-
based differences: 
While it is true that religious identities are more salient in the politics of the Middle East 
than before, it is also true that state actors have politicized these identities in pursuit of 
political gain. The politics of authoritarian regimes is the key context for understanding this 
problem (Hashemi 2015, p. 74) 
In Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East, Hashemi and Postel (2017) offer an 
interesting replacement of sectarianism as an analytical concept. Rather than viewing it as an –ism, 
void of any meaningful content and which implies a static and unassailable characteristic of opposing 
identities, they suggest that ‘sectarianization’ is a better term to use. They define it as a dynamic 
process “shaped by political actors operating within specific contexts, pursuing political goals that 
involve popular mobilization around particular (religious) identity markers” (Hashemi and Postel 
2017, p. 4). Paulo G. H. Pinto (2017) expands this understanding by describing the sectarianization of 
the Syrian conflict as a process that has unfolded on multiple levels: 
top-down (state-generated); bottom-up (socially generated); outside-in (fueled by regional 
forces); and inside-out (the spread of Syria’s conflict into neighboring states). (Pinto 2017, 
p. 123) 
Indeed, for our purposes, ‘sectarianization’ is far more suitable as a term in that it displays the 
dynamics at play in processes of contested and contesting identities. Conceptualizing 
sectarianization, therefore, means to move beyond primordialism and instrumentalist explanations 
and accommodate approaches that acknowledge the complexities of identities, temporal and spatial 
contexts as the well as the dual dependency of structural constraints and individual agency. A 
narrative identity approach may well offer a potential opportunity to enhance our theoretical 
understanding of these issues. 
Inspired by Adam Gaiser’s narrative identity approach, this study will adopt his understanding 
of sectarianism as “participatory discourses” where individuals emplot themselves (Gaiser 2017, p. 
62). Rather than viewing sect affiliation as something permanent and essential, it is a “dynamic and 
conscious process of adoption, maintenance, and manipulation of certain types of narrative identities 
in particular places and at particular times by particular persons or groups of persons” (Gaiser 2017, 
p. 62). This perspective is more attuned to our investigation of sectarianized outlooks held by Syrian 
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refugees. It allows for exploring individual sectarian claims or rejections by actors in their everyday 
lives (Tobin 2018, p. 225), at the same time as it looks at larger hegemonic discourses enveloping the 
“smaller stories” at any given time and place in history. 
3.2. Syria’s Master Narrative Landscape 
It will come as no surprise that political identity narratives abound in the midst of an ongoing 
Syrian civil war. In a multi-religious Syria, where a Sunni majority exists side by side with larger and 
smaller minorities—such as Alawites, Christians, Druze, Ismailis, Shiites, and Yezidis—views 
regarding the nature of their sectarian relations are contested.7 These contestations are also reflected 
in the discursive field of larger stories we may subsume under concepts such as “master narratives” 
(Bamberg 2005) or “metanarratives” (Lyotard 1984). Challenged by the dramatic events occurring in 
the wake of the Arab Spring, many of the prevailing hegemonic discourses in Syria were seriously 
challenged, according to Frida Nome (2016). Considered a time of crisis, it also triggered crises of 
identity in which competing “forces [would] try to hegemonize the social arena, each presenting its 
own framework as the only possible solution to the crisis” (Nome 2016, p. 43). 
According to a report on Syria issued through the Master Narrative Platform (2012), three sets of 
highly competitive master narratives have shaped the Syrian political context both before and after 
the uprising in 2011.8 The first one is categorized as “consensus narratives”; stories which are widely 
shared across the different divides of the Syrian society. On the one hand, these narratives concern 
the proud civilizational history of Greater Syria, including its perceived history of multicultural and 
inter-religious conviviality and coexistence (cf. Løland 2019; Chatty 2017; Stolleis 2015). On the other 
hand, they include conspiracies regarding foreign and domestic forces that threaten to disrupt this 
legacy’s survival. The second category concerns the legitimacy of the Alawite dominated Assad-
regime and its supporters, and includes narratives which are “carefully crafted and cultivated to 
justify and buttress autocratic rule” (Master Narrative Platform 2012, p. 8). Standing in conflict with 
the second category, the third forms a buffer containing an array of disruptive voices whose aims are 
to confront the regime and change the status quo. Among the disruptive voices mentioned in the 
report, are revolutionaries, Sunnis, and Kurds (Master Narrative Platform 2012, p. 9)—segments in 
society advocating for long-desired freedoms, although not necessarily sharing the same means by 
which to achieve this vision.  
However broadly conceived and insufficiently covered, the report on Syrian master narratives 
provides a valuable backdrop for the following analysis of individual narratives from a Syrian 
refugee context.9 Authored in 2012, at the very beginning of the civil war, the report neglects, for 
instance, to include the Islamist and jihadists discourses that began to enter the narrative battlefield 
during this time. Notwithstanding, already early on, Syria’s master narrative landscape points to 
deep and existential schisms “characterized by conflict across ethnic, sectarian, and political lines” 
(Master Narrative Platform 2012, p. 8).  
                                                 
7 The ethno-religious composition of Syria’s demography is in itself a contested issue and numbers vary in 
different surveys. One pre-war (2009) estimation places the total Syrian population to approximately 21 
million people, out of which 74% were Sunni Muslims, 16% other Muslims (including Alawites, Shiites, 
Ismailis and Druze) and 10% Christians of various denominations. Cf. 
http://www.heritageforpeace.org/syria-country-information/geography/.  
8 The platform is a collaboration between Open Source Center, Monitor 360 and other partners across the US 
Government and it gives the following definition of master narratives: “Master narratives are the historically 
grounded stories that reflect a community’s identity and experiences, or explain its hopes, aspirations, and 
concerns. These narratives help groups understand who they are and where they come from, and how to 
make sense of unfolding developments around them”. Cf. Country Report on Syria (Master Narrative 
Platform 2012, p. 6) accessible online: https://info.publicintelligence.net/OSC-SyriaMasterNarratives.pdf. 
9 There are more recent reports of interest, such as Sectarianism in Syria (The Day After (TDA) 2016), a survey 
study conducted by the organization The Day After. Another is the compilation Playing the Sectarian Card, 
edited by Frederike Stolleis (2015), in which space is given to identities and affiliations from different 
minority perspectives. 
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In the Syrian national and official discourse and during the two Assad-regimes, the issue of 
sectarianism has occupied an odd double-status. On the one hand, the sectarian narrative has been 
connected with the historically loaded Arabic term of ‘fitna’ which, aside from its original Qur’anic 
usage, has come to mean “chaos”, “anarchy”, “discord”, “sedition”, “trial”, and “civil war” (Nome 
2016; Tobin 2018).10 Issued as a stark warning, this term was invoked several times during president 
Bashar al-Assad’s first speech to the nation after the revolution erupted in 2011.11 On the other hand, 
and conditioned by the first, are the controlling measures intended to keep a tight lid on “the cauldron 
of ancient hatreds” (Dixon 2017, p. 21), thereby instilling a sense of fear concerning any expression of 
sub-national or sectarian identifications. Highly politicized and subject to vilification, therefore, 
sectarianism in Syria has been subject to an enforced silence in a quid pro quo policy of guaranteeing 
peaceful coexistence against threatening sectarian forces. The paradox of this narrative, as noted by 
many, is that it is always reliant upon an external and demonized sectarian “other”, while 
simultaneously masking the very sectarian and power-related measures that have helped sustain the 
regime’s dominant discourse (Dixon 2017; al-Haj Saleh 2017; Wimmen 2017).  
As noted by Christopher Phillips, “[s]ect was officially dismissed and an inclusive, Syrian Arab 
nationalism encouraged, but politizised sect identities were simultaneously reproduced, either by the 
regime or by internal and external enemies” (Phillips 2015, p. 366). In the wake of the revolution, 
however, it is important to note that all parties to the conflict have engaged in sectarian rhetoric and 
committed sectarian-based violence against an enemy other. Thus, layers of new master stories have 
been added to the Syrian landscape and shaped the battlefield as different rebel groups, Islamists, 
domestic and foreign militias, as well as regional and international forces, have sought to hegemonize 
their version of events. A mutual game of blame has occurred between actors in the conflict, accusing 
each other of “trying to foment sectarian chaos whilst simultaneously framing themselves as beacons 
of hope for all Syrians” (Browne 2015, p. 13).  
In our forthcoming narrative inquiry, we shall view these master stories, not as canonical 
templates confined within impermeable boundaries. Rather, as will become evident, refugee voices 
operating on the micro-level in exile, relate to these narrative frames sometimes by subscribing to 
them and other times by rejecting them, revealing for the most part experiences that come in-between 
or cut across and move beyond publically sanctioned discourses.  
4. Tracing Sectarianization: Syrian Refugee Narratives on the Revolution and Emerging War 
The Arab Spring that swept over the Middle East during late 2010 and the early parts of 2011 
was met with bewilderment, disbelief, and cautious anticipation among Syrians. Whereas few dared 
to envision that protests could help dethrone the authoritarian and long-standing regime in Syria—
such as witnessed in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt—others were dreading such a scenario to unfold in 
their midst. For some, the revolutionary winds that eventually reached Syria carried promises of a 
nascent utopia; an exuberant turning point breathing life and activism into a nation of oppressed. For 
others, however, it was considered a dystopic nightmare seriously destabilizing life as they knew it. 
By tracing the processes of sectarianization through the extremities of revolution and an emerging 
war, the following trajectories are divided into four narrative clusters we can subsume under the 
headings of hope, fear, victimization, as well as hate and distrust. Voiced by Syrian refugees in exile, 
their stories and the ensuing narrative analysis reveal a spectrum of experiences together 
representing a highly fragmented and contested mirror image of what took place in 2011 and 
onwards.  
  
                                                 
10 In its Islamic usage, the term ‘fitna’ refers to the trials and uprisings that occurred within the early Muslim 
community during the seventh century, the result of which were multiple civil wars and the final religious 
schism between Sunnites and Shi’ites. 
11 Cf. https://www.c-span.org/video/?298760-1/syria-president-bashar-al-assadhe. 
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4.1. Calling for Freedom: Narratives of Hope 
In 2011, Rania was a young and ambitious under-graduate student from Damascus with a Sunni-
Muslim background. She had many discussions with her friends regarding the Arab Spring. “We 
were all divided”, she says, depending on “subjective opinions and where each one of us was 
standing in that historic moment”. She recalls watching the news when the Egyptian president Hosni 
Mubarak stepped down in February 2011, and some of her friends exclaimed: “We hope that this 
doesn’t happen here! We don’t want our country to fall into chaos!”. They were not necessarily happy 
about the Syrian regime, according to Rania, but they preferred the status quo rather than not 
knowing who would fill the gap should the Assad-regime be removed. Rania herself, however, said 
she and many others were “extremely hopeful”. They actually started to believe that if Mubarak 
could fall, so could Assad. If protests at the Tahrir square could bring about such pivotal changes, so 
could people in Syria. For Rania, it was a moment inaugurating what she terms as a “tsunami of 
hope”. Although it was among her friends from minority groups that skepticism prevailed the 
strongest, many of them also collectively shared her hopes for reforms in Syria. In Rania’s opinion, 
the call for democratic changes was secular in nature as it transcended sub-identity affiliations and 
carved out a “new space” which brought “communal solidarity” to the forefront of the opposition. 
Nasser, a middle-aged Sunni-Muslim merchant from the suburbs of Damascus, reiterates this 
democratic demand: “We wanted freedom, equality, and social justice. It was as simple as that”, he 
says. He recalls that when Bashar al-Assad came to power after the death of his father in 2000, many 
were optimistic that things would change. “We had carried a burden for 30 years, and we said that 
maybe that young man [Bashar] would take the intelligence [apparatus] away”. When this ceased to 
happen, it was as if something needed to burst out. Pointing at a glass on the table, Nasser provides 
an image of what he means: “Look at this glass of water. You keep pouring and pouring and pouring 
and then, what do you think happens? It overflows!”.  
In the northeast of the county, similar sentiments were surfacing, according to Abdel. He had 
just finished his university degree in Islamic studies when the revolution started and had settled 
down with his wife and four children to help minister at a local mosque. People in that area had for 
long been poor and marginalized, according to him, and the revolution was welcomed as a way of 
breaking with the strains of the past and hoping for a better future.  
My feeling, or the feeling of the majority of the ordinary people, was a sense of something 
called freedom. We had the chance to breathe freedom, and that was a wonderful feeling. I 
felt we were born again! 
A member of the small minority sect of Ismailis—an offshoot of Shia Islam—Hassan explains that 
when the revolution started, “people were happy that this was happening”. In the city of Salamiyah, 
considered the “Ismaili capital” in Syria, people “had so many reasons to go out [and demonstrate]”, 
he says. 
What is evident from the voices of Hassan, Abdel, Nasser, and Rania is that the revolution for 
many brought about a general spirit of hope amid long-suppressed feelings of oppression, economic 
deprivation, and lack of freedom and democratic rights. For Nasser, as for many others, the last drop 
that made the cup run over was triggered by events occurring in the southwestern city of Daraa in 
March 2011. After at least 15 children were arrested and allegedly tortured for writing anti-Assad 
slogans on the wall of their school (Wimmen 2017; Lister 2015), people took to the streets, calling for 
a release of the children and asking for reforms. These initial protests in Daraa—later named the 
“cradle of the revolution”—subsequently sparked the revolutionary fire that spread across the 
country. Echoing Nasser’s claim, the human rights activist Rafif Jouejati has summarized what she 
identifies as the main objective for the protest movement, namely “the right for all Syrians to live in 
peace and dignity; to freely practice their religious and political beliefs; to be equal citizens before the 
law”.12 As corroborated in other empirical studies (Pearlman 2017; Hindy and Ghaddar 2017; Sørvig 
                                                 
12 Jouejati (2015).  
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2017), those who were positively inclined towards the revolution perceived the uprising as a process 
of liberation and a grand new era, filled with euphoric hopes for a new beginning.  
At the outset, as Rania confirms, sectarianism was not a major driver that propelled the 
revolution. According to Heiko Wimmen, “the Syrian protesters who rose up against the regime of 
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2011 adopted a non-sectarian approach” (Wimmen 2017, p. 61). 
It was a non-violent and primarily civic uprising that cut across religion, sect, and ethnicity. Echoed 
in slogans such as “One, one, one, the Syrian people are one” (“Wahid, Wahid, Wahid, al-Sha’b al-Suri 
Wahid”), many of the revolutionaries purported to advocate an explicit inclusiveness.13 Thus, in the 
beginning, anti-regime and pro-revolutionary protests stressed that all Syrians were one and united, 
“rather than members of religious groups like the Alawis, Druzes, Isma’ilis, Sunnis or Kurds” (van 
Dam 2017, p. 5).  
Certainly, before the war, there existed a widely held national narrative of Syria as a harmonious 
state in which diversity coexisted, and cross-sectarian interaction was embraced as a natural part of 
the Syrian identity fabric (Løland 2019). This is not to say, however, that religious references were 
not mobilized from the beginning of the uprising or that sectarian tensions were absent in the Syrian 
society. There existed already political practices in which rights and privileges were unevenly and 
discriminately distributed among the population (Pinto 2017, p. 124), creating much frustration and 
underlying tensions in society.  
It is against this policy, as well as the general features of authoritarianism and the extensive 
power mechanisms exerted by the two Assad regimes that our interlocutor’s call for freedom must 
be understood. Indeed, as Nasser alludes to, this power was nowhere more visible than in institutions 
such as the army, police, and the notorious intelligence services (mukhabarat), whose eyes and ears 
were perceived to be omnipresent (Wimmen 2017, p. 69; Lister 2015, p. 29). Taken together, they did 
much to effectively cement the totalitarian and threatening nature of the Syrian state.14  
4.2. Breaking the Silence: Narratives of Fear 
In her seminal narrative research, Wendy Pearlman has categorized different types of fear 
engulfing the Syrian civil war. One she names “silencing fear”, alluding to how authoritarianism 
produces climates of insecurity and compliance through surveillance, intimidation, and detentions 
(Pearlman 2016, p. 24). Another is called “surmounted fear”—a type of fear which accompanied the 
uprising and which, rather than silencing, encouraged and empowered the “fight for political voice” 
(Pearlman 2016, p. 26). Both of these types of fear are tangled up with issues of identities as evident 
in the following stories of Hassan, Said, and Nasser.  
The impression that all minorities were unequivocally siding with the regime is inaccurate, 
according to Hassan. It clouds the fact that many were hiding their dissatisfaction behind an apparent 
and fear-driven showcase of support for the authorities. After Daraa, however, and judging by the 
huge amount of protesters in the street, Hassan took it as a clear sign that something significant was 
happening in the country and that “a wall of fear had been broken”. 
Such a break, however, did not come without personal costs and dire expenses for many. In the 
outskirts of Damascus, Said watched the unfolding events occurring in the country with a mixture of 
joy and uneasiness. Coming from a family with a traditional Sunni Muslim background, he 
sympathized with the protesters for reasons that cut across both socio-economic and religious 
                                                 
13 Kahf (2011). See also Salamandra (2013, p. 303); Abbas (2014, p. 53); and Pinto (2017, p. 128). 
14 Cf. Global Security report: “A range of techniques are used by the security services to co-opt or intimidate 
Syrians. These techniques, at the most accommodating end of the spectrum, include offers of remunerative, 
prestigious positions and other rewards. At the opposite end they routinely involve coercive measures such 
as travel bans, surveillance and harassment of both individuals and family members, the threat of detention 
(without charge), interrogation, and imprisonment after lengthy trials. It is often in the middle range, 
between enticements and threats, that the Syrian security services are at their most effective, curbing dissent, 
obliging people to report on their friends and colleagues, and convincing them sometimes to present regime 
arguments justifying policies or decisions.” https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/syria/intro.htm. 
See also (al-Haj Saleh 2017, pp. 236–37). 
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concerns, believing that the majority Sunni population was for long underprivileged and had 
suffered discrimination at the hands of the Alawite-dominated elite in society. He believed that the 
revolution might bring about some positive changes, that “perhaps now, someone will listen to us”. 
Living in a small village surrounded by military bases, however, Said felt he had to keep this hope 
well hidden. “Inside I was very happy about what was happening, but I couldn’t show it. I couldn’t 
participate in any of the demonstrations because I had responsibilities towards my family”. He 
describes how Assad’s security forces penetrated these early and non-violent demonstrations, 
observed who took part in them and later hunted them down. “In my neighborhood, eleven young 
men were arrested in the middle of the night, and three of them never returned alive”. One of the 
men who came back told Said about the torture and humiliating treatments they had suffered while 
incarcerated in the prison of Saydnaya. “He was not a man anymore,” Said recalls, “he was just a sick 
and broken shadow of himself”.15 This man gave him an imperative warning that stuck with Said up 
until he left Syria for good and which solidified his fear of breaking the silence: “Whatever you do, 
never ever say anything against Assad!”  
Nasser, on the other hand, was one who fervently embraced the revolutionary call and actively 
took part in the early demonstrations. Nevertheless, he recalls how he needed to balance the fear of 
speaking up with the fear of his own and his family’s safety when taking to the streets. He claims to 
have seen how intelligence officers brutally cracked down on the demonstrators, and how the regime 
brought “drug dealers and other criminals” to infiltrate in their midst in order “to make it look like 
the demonstrations were not peaceful, that we are terrorists”. This was a game the regime played, 
according to Nasser, with the intent of distorting the image of the revolution from the very beginning. 
It provoked him since, in his words, “we didn’t carry anything, I swear, no weapons, no sticks, only 
our voice”. 
Representative of these stories is the impression that the Syrian regime for decades had created 
a nation in fear and a “kingdom of silence” (Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami 2016). Both Said and Nasser 
show how institutions of enforcement and punishment placed a heavy burden upon anyone 
attempting to raise their voice and take part in the demonstrations. Ever since the Arab Socialist 
Ba’ath Party came to power in 1963 and consolidated the Syrian Emergency Law, any public 
gatherings or signs of political dissent have been outlawed and coercively repressed by the two 
Assad-regimes (al-Haj Saleh 2017). The Syrian regime also went to great lengths of controlling and 
managing its power symbolically, as alluded to by Hassan when he talks about displaying a showcase 
of support. What Lisa Wedeen (2015) has named the “cult of Assad” is a compelling example of this. 
This cult became the axis around which the authoritarian control circulated and took a strangling 
hold of the society, according to her (Wedeen 2015, p. 30). It consisted of spectacles of support and 
the vocabulary of veneration for—if not worship of—the Ba’ath party and its leader, as well as other 
forms of carefully crafted rhetorical strategies designed to enforce obedience, induce complicity and 
ensure loyalty. These measures were both powerful and effective as they deeply penetrated “people’s 
experiences of everyday political life” (Wedeen 2015, p. 30) and “succeeded in conditioning the 
behavior of most Syrians” (Perthes 1995, p. 148).16 
A significant aspect of these symbolic power mechanisms was the enforced silence concerning 
all talk on sectarianism and sub-national identities. “The topic of sectarianism is one of the worst 
political taboos in Assad’s Syria. Not only is it a source of intellectual and political paralysis, but also 
a mask that hides the regime’s sectarian practices and its manipulation of Syrian society” (al-Haj 
Saleh 2017, p. 292).17 While this policy aimed to strengthen a secular narrative of a unified Syrian 
                                                 
15 Cf. “About Saydnaya”, Amnesty International: https://saydnaya.amnesty.org/en/saydnaya.html.  
16 An emerging body of testimonial writings and literary memoirs published by Syrians in exile (Halasa et al. 
2014; Yazbek 2016; Malek 2017; al-Haj Saleh 2017; Eid 2018; Abouzeid 2018), themselves a result of breaking 
with the imposed and self-censored regulations for public speech, attest to this collectively internalized fear 
of speaking up and voicing anything that could infringe upon the officially sanctioned discourse. 
17 See also Stolleis (2015, p. 8); Worren (2007); Salamandra (2013); Haddad (2017); Hindy and Ghaddar (2017). 
According to one activist interviewed by Hindy and Ghaddar (2017), now a refugee in Lebanon, “the 
dictatorship forbade us from expressing our primary identities”. Throughout the whole of Syria’s modern 
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Arab national identity, it did not succeed in banning sectarianism from society. Rather, by 
designating ethno-religious identities as a forbidden and hypersensitive topic, it helped foster 
ignorance of and prejudice towards the religious other, as witnessed particularly in the Syrian 
education system (Bali 2015). For Said, such silencing and negating of differences seem to have 
infringed upon him a sense of being different or alienated. Although a member of the majority 
population, as a Sunni Muslim he felt that he was not listened to and became marginalized 
economically as well as religiously. 18  In part, Said’s frustration and hope may be understood 
politically as a demand for greater inclusion, respect, and representation against the refusal of a 
ruling elite to share power.  
Nasser, on the other hand, expresses his distress of being mis-identified as a ‘terrorist’ when 
partaking in peaceful demonstrations. Indeed, as noted by many scholars, one of the factors that 
brought about a sectarian twist from the outset of the revolution, even before the uprising turned 
violent, was the regime’s quick intent of portraying the demonstrations as a “foreign conspiracy” 
consisting of “Salafi terrorists” and “armed gangs” (Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami 2016, p. 40; see also 
Stolleis 2015). It was a carefully drafted master narrative that purported to present Syria as a victim 
against forces determined to “sow sectarian strife” (Wimmen 2017, p. 63) and incite violence that 
would pose a security threat to the nation. Integral to the shaping of this narrative was to strengthen 
the legitimacy behind the military’s responses and to scare people, particularly the minorities, into 
siding with the regime. 
According to Balanche, this narrative comes across as “an astounding bit of hypocrisy from a 
regime that relies on the loyalty of an Alawite minority and does all it can to divide its Sunni citizens” 
(Balanche 2018, p. 130). Such a divide and rule policy became particularly evident when a presidential 
amnesty was issued for the release of hundreds of Islamist prisoners in late March 2011. This move 
was, according to Charles L. Lister, “yet another devious attempt by the Assad regime to manipulate 
its adversary, this time by unleashing those it could safely label ‘jihadist’ or ‘extremist’ amongst its 
ranks” (Lister 2015, p. 53). Indeed, as noted by Wimmen, the discriminatory measures that the 
authorities undertook to allegedly safeguard the peace, in fact hastened “the outbreak of the very 
sectarian conflict the regime was purportedly warning against” (Wimmen 2017, p. 63). 
In the Syrian national discourse, labeling political adversaries as terrorists is a sectarian practice 
with historical antecedents, the most recent of which is pointing back to the sectarian conflict that 
raged between the ruling regime of Hafez al-Assad and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s 
and 80s.  
4.3. The Haunting of Hama: Narratives of Victimization 
Looming on the horizon of fear for most Syrians is the domestic turbulence that culminated with 
the Hama massacre in 1982. These events have deeply affected generations of Syrians irrespective of 
their religious or sectarian background. The conflict involves the long-standing and mutual enmity 
between the Ba’ath party and the Muslim Brotherhood over the place of religion and religious 
authority in the Syrian society.19 Shadows of this past seem to have resurfaced under the Syrian 
revolution, and a majority of my interlocutors mentions it in one way or another, as reflected here in 
the stories of Dany, Maryam, and Hassan. 
Dany is a manager with a Christian Orthodox background who worked in the region of Latakia 
when the uprising started. He presents a counter-narrative to many of the more euphorically tinted 
                                                 
history, he asserts, “the regime and the Ba’ath party had held a monopoly over discussions of identity”, 
quelling the very diversity upon which the Syrian society historically rested. 
18 See Balanche (2018) for reports regarding socio-economic and political discrimination against the Sunni 
population prior to and during the uprising. 
19 Disputes regarding the weight of religion in the Syrian society goes back to 1973 when Islamists, represented 
by the Muslim Brotherhood, demanded that the Syrian constitution included a stricter Islamic 
jurisprudence: “Assad’s attempt to enact a constitution that did not stipulate sharia as the source of law 
sparked riots. He was forced to reinstate the charter’s sharia roots, including an article mandating that the 
head of the state has to be Muslim” (Balanche 2018, p. 117). 
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stories of the revolution that we have encountered so far. “Suddenly there were angry people in the 
streets throwing stones and chanting”, he says. “We were scared, and we didn’t know what was 
happening”. Eventually, after having seen what took place across Syria, Dany concluded that this 
was not a revolution. “It wasn’t about freedom or the Arabic spring. No, no, the start was really only 
in Sunni areas where people wanted to make problems”. His suspicion was strengthened by the fact 
that most demonstrations occurred after the Friday services in the mosques.20 “Since the beginning, 
we knew that there is a conspiracy,” Bassem explained, “and that those boys [the demonstrators] 
were not innocent. They were manipulated and paid to make trouble and start the war in Syria”. He 
and many with him believed that the instigators came from the Muslim Brotherhood, “because we 
know from history that this group had problems with the government”.  
In a similar vein, Maryam—a Christian employee from Damascus—describes that what 
occurred on the streets, was not an expression of oppression or a call for freedom. “The ones who 
came out in the demonstrations, all Syrians disliked them. They were uneducated and ill-mannered.” 
For her too, “it was all like a conspiracy. They wanted to destroy Syria, to erase the history and 
civilization (…). This is what was planned”. The real reason for Sunni Muslims to resent the president, 
according to Maryam, was “merely because he is an Alawite”, alluding to the historically sanctioned 
critical discourse directed against Alawites from both orthodox Sunni and Shia communities.21  
Hassan, on the other hand, although himself belonging to the Ismaili minority group, saw in the 
regime’s brutal handling of the revolution a repetition of the slaughtering that occurred in Hama. 
Many of the victims of Hama sought refuge in his town of Salamiya, he explains, “and we welcomed 
them as brothers”. This gesture did not go unnoticed by the regime, according to Hassan, who 
believes that the revolution gave the government an opportunity for revenge against the citizen’s 
disloyalty three decades earlier. 
The sectarian script that the Syrian regime’s narrative upheld from the beginning found a 
particularly receptive audience by the minorities. However, the role of the minorities during the 
outbreak of the revolution is highly debatable and should be scrutinized for its often biased 
representation in much literature (Khoury 2015). It is a myth, according to Mohja Kahf, that minorities 
did not participate in the Syrian uprising.22 Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that for many, 
support for Assad rested as much on fear of an Islamist insurgence as it did on a sense of protection 
under the wings of a secular state. For others, remaining silent or neutral was triggered by a host of 
different factors, for example by fear of loosing one’s job and financial goodwill or being 
excommunicated from one’s family and religious community.  
Both Dany and Maryam are reiterating many of the specific religious minority experiences and 
Christian fears regarding the uprising which, colored by skepticism and conspiracy theories, appear 
to conform with the regime’s master narrative of victimization (Bandak 2015; Schmoller 2016). A 
common denominator for both is the historical reference to the Muslim Brotherhood and the threat 
of militant Islamism towards other religious groups. The Muslim Brotherhood’s attacks on Alawite 
targets during the late 1970s and early ’80s exacerbated fear in most Syrian minority communities, 
prompting many to believe that should Assad fall, their existence would perish in sectarian 
bloodshed. For many Alawites, hence, these attacks evoked memories of past persecution and 
massacres they had historically suffered at the hands of Sunnis at the same time as it strengthened 
                                                 
20 Pinto explains that as mosques traditionally have been the only spaces allowed for public gatherings, they 
were also appropriated by the protesters as natural “spaces they could gather and organize out of sight of 
the security forces” (Pinto 2017, p. 126).  
21 This history goes back to the medieval times where the minority Nusayri-sect (named after its founder Ibn 
Nusayr in the 9th century) was subject to numerous religious fatwas (judgements) and were persecuted on 
basis of apostasy (Tomass 2016, p. 78). According to Shi’a scholar Heinz Halm (2004), modern criticism of 
the Assad regime “use anti-Nusayri religious slogans in order to bring the head of the state into disrepute 
as a non-Muslim and a heretic, while al-Asad tried to counter this by public participation at prayers in the 
mosque. In order to dispel talk of heresy the Nusayris have from the beginning of the present century called 
themselves ‘Alawis’ (‘Alawiyyun), i.e., ‘Ali supporters of Shi’ites, and thus have attempted to get themselves 
recognized (…) within the Islamic community” (Halm 2004, p. 157).  
22 Kahf (2013). 
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their sectarian ties of loyalty to Assad (Balanche 2018, pp. 117–18; Worren 2007). We find a similar 
deep-seated skepticism towards the Sunnis among many Christians, and their existential fear of 
extinction have provoked minority solidarity and pro-regime sentiments. In Maryam’s story, we may 
see such skepticism reflected in her categorization of the demonstrators as “all disliked” and “ill-
mannered”—a stereotyped enemy other subject to a “language of dehumanization” (van Liere 2014, 
p. 37). 
According to Torstein Schiøtz Worren, the historical traumas, along with the more recent 
sectarian offences perpetrated by the Muslim Brotherhood, have shaped the Alawis’ identity 
narrative as one of victimization (Worren 2007, p. 102). This narrative does not merely concern a felt 
theological inferiority in which a perceived hegemonic Sunni discourse views Alawism with 
suspicion and as a heretical expression of Islam. It is also reflected politically in the fear of Alawites 
being judged as a group and collectively held accountable for their sect-based ties to the ruling regime 
(Worren 2007, p. 103).23 Indeed, the mixture of religious and political resentments against the Alawis 
were reformulated by the influential spiritual spokesperson for the Muslim Brotherhood, Yousef al-
Qaradawi, in 2013. Continuing in the medieval tradition of Ibn Taymiyya, he denounced the Alawis 
as “more infidel than Christians and Jews” and called for Muslims everywhere to go to Syria and 
fight them (Tomass 2016, pp. 78, 161). 
For most Sunni Muslims, however, what is remembered from the sectarian battle against the 
Muslim Brotherhood is its culmination in the Hama massacre in which somewhere between 10,000 
to 40,000 people were killed (Lister 2015, p. 26). With this campaign, the regime inflicted a brutal 
defeat not only upon the Muslim Brotherhood but inaugurated an era “during which Sunni Islam 
and religion in general were kept tightly controlled by the state apparatus” (Lister 2015, p. 26). In al-
Haj Saleh’s opinion, the Hama massacre in 1982 was “the end-point, not to the conflict with Islamists, 
but to any political rights for all Syrians” (al-Haj Saleh 2017, p. 236). As seen from the story of Hassan, 
this resulted in waves of civilian displacement from Hama, where both refugees and the hosts that 
gave them refuge were, in his interpretation, victimized and unjustifiably targeted as traitors to the 
regime.  
According to Pearlman, the events of Hama “cannot be overstated” (Pearlman 2016, p. 24). They 
are subsumed under the long-buried narratives of fear and have collectively affected entire 
generations. Similarily, Rapahël Lefèvre shows in the Ashes of Hama (Lefèvre 2013) how the public 
memory of those events are deeply reinscribed into the current conflict in Syria. Thus, although for 
different and contested reasons, these historical incidents have made a lasting imprint on the 
memories of Sunni Muslims and minorities alike. The haunting of Hama appears to be a collective 
inheritance having caused transgenerational traumatic group inflictions. This brings to mind Vamik 
Volkan’s term ‘chosen trauma’ which he explains as “a large group’s mental representation of a 
historic event that resulted in collective feelings of helplessness, victimization, shame, and 
humiliation at the hands of ‘others,’ and typically involves drastic losses of people, land, prestige, 
and dignity” (Volkan 2006, p. 173). When internalized, these injuries tend to be transmitted to the 
next generation, causing wounds to remain unhealed, while at the same time instilling a sense of 
“we-ness” which solidifies group identity (Volkan 2006, p. 173). 24  As shown, the trans- and 
                                                 
23 These links to the regime have been subject to grave generalizations and misunderstandings, as shown in 
the study by Worren: “In the political conflicts of Syria, Alawis feel they are hated by ‘The Other’ because 
of the mistakes of the regime. It is a myth, they say, that we gain in any way from a shared religious 
background. Instead, the nepotism so visible is about personal relations with powerful families, both Sunni, 
Christian and Alawi, and not sect. Some, therefore, present their shared background as a curse rather than 
a blessing” (Worren 2007, p. 98). 
24 Activist Kassem Eid in his autobiography My Country. A Syrian Memoir (Eid 2018, p. 128) describes an 
example of such a transgenerational trauma and links it to the current Syrian civil war: “Perhaps it was out 
of frustration that we, the youth of Syria, had dared to hope and dream of a better future. Our parents had 
betrayed us by sleepwalking through their whole lives. They should have known after the Hama massacre 
of 1982 that the Assad family was too brutal to be allowed to hold power for another generation. They should 
have screamed their lungs out, fought tooth and nail, and struggled with all of their force after seeing that 
brutality the Assad regime was capable of. Instead, they kept silent as Hafez al-Assad set in motion a 
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intergenerational trauma of Hama is situated at the interface of competing narratives of victimization. 
Together they function as one of many interpretative keys to an enhanced understanding of the 
conflicting outlooks regarding the uprising and revolution.  
4.4. Encountering the Religious Other: Narratives of Hate and Mistrust 
In my study, most of the interlocutors negate harboring any negative sectarian sentiments 
against ‘the religious other’. Rather, what many underpins with both pride and vigor is the multi-
ethnic and plural religious character of the Syrian society before the war, where friendship and 
relations cut across sectarian or religious divides. Subsumed under stories of “paradise lost” (Løland 
2019), this grand narrative of conviviality simultaneously hides certain undercurrents of tensions that 
gained momentum and became intensified during the revolution and emerging war. Through the 
following stories of Mahmoud, Maryam, Dany, Said, Abdel, Nasser, and Rania, reflections of 
palpable changes in attitudes concerning people’s ethnic, religious, and political affiliations take 
shape. Whether real or imagined, differences emerged as potential threatening issues, derailing the 
relations between family members, friends, neighbors, and colleagues (Stolleis 2015).  
Mahmoud, a Sunni-Arab industrial worker, explains how he experienced this shift of mentality 
in his multi-religious workplace: 
After a while, we couldn’t accept each other (…). The Alawis were sitting together, they 
would not speak to anyone else, and the Sunnis the same, the Christians the same. We were 
trying to avoid each other. We actually became afraid of each other. (…) The situation in 
Syria was such that you couldn’t trust your brother, so it was very difficult, and we were 
all separated in very small groups. It was much better to stay alone than expressing your 
feelings to anyone because no one could be trusted. 
In the beginning, Mahmoud could never have fathomed that the surfacing conflict would grow 
into a civil war where fellow Syrians pointed their guns at each other. However, “when the army 
started with the tanks and the bombs and their heavy weapons, it came to a point where everyone 
knew that, ok, now it is eternal, it will all go to hell!” After having experienced dire losses of lives in 
his close family, hatred became inevitable for Mahmoud. Although much of it was due to an 
increased feeling of general insecurity as well as violent atrocities perpetrated by the regime, he gave 
it a discernable sectarian face: 
There were many Sunnis who were fighting with the regime and who were killing us. But 
I can say that more than 90% were Alawites and Shiites, so I feel until now that I hate them. 
I can’t forgive them.  
Despite harboring anti-Alawite hate and resentment, Mahmoud refused to take an active part in 
support for any of the groups warring each other. “I wasn’t ready to get involved in this conflict, to 
kill or be killed”, he says. “Both of them [the regime and the opposition parties] were bad for us. The 
Syrian army bombed us, and the opposition fighters stole from us. No one was looking for Syria; no 
one was caring for the country. Everyone had its own project”. 
In his job as a religious cleric, Abdel was another first-hand witness to the gradual changes that 
took place in the community where he ministered: 
Before the war, and especially in the place where I was living, there were strong tribal 
relationships. But after the war, the youth, in particular, joined different groups, causing a 
difference in opinions and confrontations. Once they were friends and shared strong 
relations, before splitting up and going with one group or another. 
Being a figure of religious authority in his village, Abdel says that he was pressured by both moderate 
rebels as well as different emerging Salafist groups expecting him to give his allegiance and public 
support for their cause. For years, until ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) entered his 
                                                 
murderous plan to annihilate his future opponent. We, the youth of Syria, turned out to be those future 
opponents—and because our parents’ generation kept silent, we paid a price in blood.” 
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village in 2014, he says it was a tight balance not to be caught in the web of anyone’s particular 
political agenda: 
We didn’t want to be judged as one of them. So we tried to avoid that or be neutral so that 
we didn’t get in conflict with any of them. That was until the time of ISIL. They wouldn’t 
even give you a choice to remain neutral.  
From a Christian minority point of view, Maryam reiterates the shock and disbelief regarding the 
dramatic changes that gradually took a hold in people’s attitudes towards each other. She recalls that, 
before the war, 
we did not think that we are Christians and they are Muslims. We were together, 
celebrating everything together, sharing life, supporting each other. Most of the Muslims 
were very good to us. It was a nice and peaceful life. 
After a while, however, she felt there was an increased sense of threat directed towards her and other 
religious minorities:  
At the beginning of the war, do you know what they called out in the mosques? ‘Christians 
to Beirut and Alawites to the tomb’! While walking around, strict Muslims would tell you 
things like ‘Huh, still here? Why are you not in Beirut?’. And to the Alawites: ‘Ah, you’re 
still alive, why are you not dead?’. So what kind of emotions will you get when you hear 
things like this? In your own country! 
This kind of sectarian language in addition to other factors, such as stories of kidnappings of 
Christians as well as everyday shooting and bombings in the vicinity of her house, prompted Maryam 
to leave Syria behind. It is not without bitterness and remorse she looks back at this decision, pointing 
her finger at an undefined culprit called “They” whilst yielding that, for the Christians, there were 
no victories to be gained in this war:  
We heard that we are not welcome in this place anymore and that we are few people and 
need to get out. You’ll feel that this is not hating, but it is something that breaks your soul. 
And this soul is my place; it’s my country and the place where my parents grew up. (…) 
They planned this for my country, now I am not important, I have to go, and we did leave 
in the end. They wanted most of the Christians to go, and we went, but why? Because it is 
not our war, it is not our game; we would have lost. Because in the end, who will win? 
Dany, for his part, explains that when the regime started to lose control of certain areas to 
opposition groups, these places became dangerous for Christians: 
The government protects us in Syria. In many places that are not under the government, 
they don’t respect Christians. If they know I’m Christian they can kill me. I’m not talking 
about Sunni terrorists like Daesh [ISIL] or al-Qaida, no, we talk about normal people. If they 
see my ID, they’d see my name is Christian. Maybe they need money and take my papers, 
or maybe they kill me.  
Based on this perception, Dany concludes that “[s]ectarianism is in the blood of Syria. It’s not positive 
or negative, but it’s a reality”. For him, the only remedy against threats to his sectarian affiliation is a 
strong regime and a stable presidency, since, in his words, “without Bashar al-Assad, no one can 
protect us”. 
From a Sunni-Muslim point of view, Said recalls that as the conflict turned increasingly violent 
and militarized, derogatory sectarian language became everyday experiences of humiliation and 
insults. “Every day I had to pass numerous checkpoints and every day I prayed that I would return 
safely back home”. The people operating the checkpoints were always suspicious about him, 
constantly probing his loyalty to Assad and harassing him for being Sunni and a potential terrorist. 
For Said, however, the most distressing about these encounters was the way they bad-mouthed 
Muslim women and threatened to abuse them sexually. “They cursed our women, and this is very 
shameful for us.”  
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Nasser also accounts for experiences of anti-Sunni talk. In fact, he claims to have witnessed how 
such talk turned lethal during Ramadan in 2011, as one of his friends got killed allegedly based on 
his Sunni identity.  
When we got out from the Mosque one evening, some Alawites came up to us and said ‘We 
will kill you, we will fuck your sisters and mothers, you Sunni dogs!’ And then they killed 
him, and I watched him die.  
This pivotal experience instilled such a profound sense of fear in Nasser that he decided to step back 
from engaging in any political activity thereafter. In retrospect, he says that the revolution and 
everything it symbolized, came to an abrupt halt at that moment. Instead of dreaming of a new Syrian 
future, he resorted to the background and found strength in his Muslim faith: 
They hated the Sunni-Muslims (…) but we leave all matters to Allah. If I weren’t a believer 
during the war, I would have gone crazy. But I have a strong belief, and Allah is the one 
that made me patient. 
Rania, on the other hand, claiming herself to be a secular Muslim, did not find any comfort in religion, 
nor did she lose faith in the revolution. When Islamists entered the revolutionary scene, the call for 
freedom and dignity was “hijacked”, according to her, and distorted by people who “developed more 
and more severe and extreme sectarian views”. Nevertheless, she maintains, “it is very crucial that 
we don’t fall into the trap of reducing everything to a sectarian conflict” as “there are so many other 
factors that play into the fragmentation of the Syrian people”. The contrast between the peaceful 
movements she initially took part in and had such great hopes for and the destructive violence 
overthrowing it is almost too daunting for her to talk about: “If you think about the mere scale of the 
[Syrian] tragedy, you’ll get paralyzed!” However, for Rania, it has been important not to let the war 
swallow what remains of the original and non-violent revolutionary message:  
Our main goal is to preserve this narrative. The fragmentation [of the Syrian people] is a 
reality now, but we are maintaining the narrative because it can so easily be forgotten, by 
the general public, even by Syrians themselves, or by the politicians or the historians.  
For Syrian activists in exile, she concludes, keeping the spark of the revolutionary narrative alive “is 
our existential task; it’s a question of who we are”. 
In this narrative section, we have seen that quite parallel to the non-sectarian and democratically 
oriented protest movement that strived for unity and coexistence in opposition, currents of counter-
narratives developed into derogatory discourses in which identity labels and sectarianized language 
gradually fueled fear and hatred against the ‘religious other’. Changes in attitudes and processes of 
sectarianization are visible in all our interlocutors’ personal stories, and whereas they are experienced 
in differentiated ways and through various times and places in Syria, they all point towards an 
increased dichotomized demarcation between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
As mentioned, the revolution was early on met by ever escalating violent responses by the Syrian 
state and security forces, prompting organizations like Human Rights Watch to qualify the atrocities 
perpetrated against the civilian population as “crimes against humanity”. 25  By mid-2011 and 
onwards, a host of new domestic and foreign political and military groups emerged to counter the 
attacks by the regime. At the same time, Islamists of different leanings attempted to exert their 
influence on the direction of the revolution (Kahf 2013). In this increasingly complex landscape of 
competing forces and battles, it is important to note, according to Darwich and Fakhoury (2016), that 
all parties to the conflict mobilized sectarian discourses and stimulated a repertoire of grand 
narratives in which the ‘sectarian other’ was constructed and framed. Thus, casting the external other 
as an existential threat became a powerful tool to mobilize around religious identities and gain 
legitimacy for the use of violence. These developments had a huge impact on the civilian population. 
As narrated by my interlocutors, inflammatory and sectarian vocabulary was both experienced by, 
                                                 
25 (Human Rights Watch 2011).  
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as well as directed against people in their everyday lives, whether Sunni-Muslims, Shiites, Alawites, 
or Christians alike.  
According to Yassin-Kassab and al-Shami (2016), the regime’s master narrative appeared to 
legitimize the targeting of Sunni Muslim communities in particular and crack down unevenly on 
demonstrators according to their religious affiliation. In Syrian prisons and detention centers, for 
example, reports have surfaced about a systematic pattern of “sectarian torture tactics” aimed at 
violating religious boundaries and demean spiritual identities of Sunni detainees (Shalabi 2017).26 
These methods could include forced verbal and physical blasphemy, such as cursing Allah and 
prostrate to images of Bashar al-Assad or provide false testimonies during inhumane treatments. 
Also, attacks on Sunni sacred shrines and other vocal insults that struck to the core of Muslim 
religiosity did much to substantiate Sunni resentment and anti-Alawite discourse (Yassin-Kassab and 
al-Shami 2016, p. 49). As seen from the stories of Said and Dawud, sexual derogatory language 
against Muslim women, daily harassment at checkpoints as well as actual deadly encounters on the 
street, were perceived as expressions and practices of severe sectarian hatred. 27  For Mustafa, 
experiences of killings and the loss of close family members generated feelings of hatred and mistrust 
in return, instilling a sense of unforgiving animosity against the Alawites.  
Correspondingly, from a minority point of view, experiences of sectarianization became visible 
early on in the conflict. Alawites in particular, but also Christians—as shown in the stories of Salma 
and Bassem—were victims of increasingly sectarian and Islamist propaganda in which slogans such 
as “Alawites into the coffin, Christians to Beirut (al-‘alawi a-tabout wa-l-masihi ila Beirut)” (Stolleis 2015, 
p. 8) created fear and islamophobic sentiments.28 Indeed, as shown by Pinto, the revolution became 
tinted with religious references pointing towards the importance of Islam as a moral framework for 
many of the revolutionaries with a Muslim background. Political slogans referring to freedom and 
dignity were mixed with the use of religious idioms such as the takbir (the chanting of “Allahu 
Akbar”) as well as the appropriation of religious symbols and spaces associated with Islam (Pinto 
2017, p. 124). While this Sunni-inflected turn inevitably created a sense of empowerment among 
many Sunni protesters (Wimmen 2017, p. 81), it both scared and repulsed others. For Nada, this turn 
manifested a sectarian violation, or “hijacking” of the original revolutionary message which she saw 
as inherently inclusive and non-religious. For Bassem, however, these developments only served to 
strengthen his mistrust towards Muslims in general and to place his political hopes and dependence 
upon the regime. For Salma, the language of sectarianism contributed to her feelings of alienation 
and inferiority as a minority Christian. The experience of sudden hostility and unwontedness by 
people she once happily shared the country with also seems to have heightened Salma’s sense of 
sadness and defeat in what she calls a game, not of her making.  
We may read all these stories as narratives of victimhood operating on many different levels. 
Whereas there are numerous ways of understanding trauma, suffering, and victimhood, processes of 
sectarianization, as witnessed in these stories, account for both intensely individual experiences as 
well as the politicization of discursive practices. None of my interlocutors were, in their words, prone 
to overt sectarianism. Yet their stories reveal how sectarian entrenchment nevertheless became 
inscribed into their life experiences, were (re)constructed through these experiences and made an 
impact on how they (re)presented themselves and the ‘religious other’.  
                                                 
26 See also an example from a video of a young blindfolded boy forced to violate the Muslim testimony of faith 
(Shahada) by pledging faith to Bashar al-Assad as his God: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SN1O5nhi7-g.  
27 This story of Said is corroborated by many other sources, the latest of which is a UN report about how Syrian 
government forces and allied militias have used rape and sexual assaults as a weapon of war. Cf. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-warcrimes-sexual/thousands-of-women-men-
children-raped-in-syrias-war-u-n-report-idUSKCN1GR1PZ. 
28 According to some sources, however, anti-minority slogans such as this was allegedly part of the Syrian 
state’s propaganda and spread in order to scare the minorities into siding with the regime (Stolleis 2015; 
Bandak 2015). 
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On the one hand, sectarianism as narratives of victimhood “seems to galvanize a sense of 
collective identity and belonging, as common suffering tends to strengthen solidarity between 
victims” (Matar and Harb 2013, p. 171; Enns 2012). On the other hand, victimhood may as much be 
associated with a sense of powerlessness against forces that overwhelm or challenge the individual’s 
capacity of agency in times of conflict. In fact, similar to Abdel’s account, many of the interlocutors 
in my study portray their position as caught in an impossible situation of in-between competing 
parties. As shown by van Liere, in times of conflict, patterns of “identification and disidentification” 
often tend to generate rudimentary identity categories in which violence and cycles of revenge are 
folded into narratives of victimization (van Liere 2009, pp. 475–78). These processes include elements 
of “dehumanization”, according to van Liere, in which belonging to an in-group identity “depends 
primarily on the exclusion of an/the other group” (van Liere 2014, p. 39), thus creating an 
“incapability to see the other as morally comparable with the self” (van Liere 2014, p. 35).  
In our Syrian context, such processes of classifications represent “crude simplifications of a 
complex matter” (Stolleis 2015, p. 6), blurring stories and experiences of ambivalence that fall outside 
of these parameters. This is why, as testified also by Rania, an essentialist reading of sectarianism is 
counterproductive for an enhanced understanding of the Syrian conflict. Processes of 
sectarianization, however, is a better way of describing the narrative realities we have encountered 
through the stories of a diverse and fragmented Syrian refugee population. Following Makdisi (2017), 
these stories serve to show that  
[r]ather than assume sectarianism to be a fixed, stable reality that floats above history, it is 
far more important to locate and identify—to historicize—each so-called ‘sectarian’ event, 
moment, structure, identification, and discourse in its particular context (Makdisi 2017, pp. 
9–10)  
5. Conclusions 
This article has attempted to trace processes of sectarianization through narratives voiced by a 
fragmented Syrian refugee population residing in Norway. Whereas a lot of research has tried to 
understand the role of sectarianism in the Syrian conflict, few studies have explored the formation of 
sectarian identities and discourses from below and through refugees’ firsthand experiences. Thus, 
this study has employed a narrative identity approach in order to demonstrate how individual 
experiences and micro-narrative testimonies intersect with a larger master-narrative landscape in 
which the concept of sectarianism occupies an important, albeit a confusing and ambiguous central 
place. I argue that essentialist and instrumentalist readings of this concept fail to capture the dynamic 
and contextually constructed nature of sectarianism. Instead, I opt for the term ‘sectarianization’ as a 
mode of conceptualization that more accurately describes processes in which contested and 
contesting identities are at play.  
By taking sectarianization as a theoretical vantage point, this study’s discussion has evolved 
around the particularities surrounding the Syrian revolution and emerging civil war as well as the 
ways in which religion, identity, and conflict intersect in the narrative realm of micro- and macro 
stories. Obviously, having restricted the time-frame of these narrative trajectories to events and 
experiences occurring during the first two years of the Syrian conflict, many important aspects of the 
Syrian civil war have been omitted. For one, all the interlocutors taking part in this study have more 
stories to tell regarding the developments that took place after 2012, when the war not only became 
increasingly internationalized but also more explicitly sectarian as, among others, violent Islamist 
groups with an overt sectarian ideology entered the scene. These developments, together with the 
general agony of war and the unfathomable levels of insecurity, devastation, and personal losses, 
contributed to the complex field of reasons that forced them to leave Syria behind and enter the new 
and unwarranted status as refugees (Løland, forthcoming). Secondly, by focusing on sectarianism as 
an expression of how religious identities and differences are constructed and gain momentum in the 
Syrian conflict, this article has devoted less attention to other equally important factors, such as issues 
concerning socio-economy, gender, and regional politics.  
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As such, this article acknowledges that processes of sectarianization are but one of many facets 
regarding the complexities surrounding the Syrian uprising and ensuing civil war. Although not 
explanatory exhaustive, the four narrative clusters that have informed our interlocutors’ trajectories 
of revolution and war, provide us with an enhanced understanding of how religion and religious 
identity constructions intersect with a complex discursive field of individual and public expressions. 
Embedded within the metaphorical frames of utopia and dystopia, these trajectories reveal a highly 
fragmented and contested space in which hope, fear, victimization as well as hate and distrust are 
reflections of ever-changing and (re-)emerging narrative identity patterns. Such patterns, as has been 
demonstrated, do not happen in a vacuum, but are deeply contingent upon memories of the past as 
well as the shifting cultural and political frameworks of a present. In our Syrian refugee context, we 
have seen that memories of a pre-war Syria throw lights on a past that many view as politically 
troubled and traumatizing. Others are inclined to maintain an idealized image of a pasttime Syria as 
opposed to the acute sense of a present chaos.  
For the Syrian refugees in my study, experiences of war as well as of the forced migratory 
journeys they have undertaken, have created new layers of past and present traumas, many of which 
cast towering shadows on their lives in exile. This study has focused on processes of sectarianization 
in their narratives concerning the early phases of the Syrian conflict. However, more reflection is 
needed as regards to the evolving discourse of sectarianization in the Syrian conflict in general. In 
particular, and in the case of a post-war Syria, new research needs to focus on how the Syrian refugee 
population discursively engage with bridging a sectarian past with prospects of future coexistence. 
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